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ARGUMENT
I
BURTON DOES NOT HOLD THE THAT UADA PROVIDES
AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IN SMALL EMPLOYER CASES
Defendant's argument misconstrues the decision in Burton
Exam Ctr.

Indus.,

2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261.

by this court in Burton

v.

The issue decided

was whether the Utah Anti-Discrimination

Act, Utah Code Anno. 34A-5-101, etc. (UADA) enunciates a policy
against age discrimination which is sufficiently public, clear
and substantial to form the basis for a tort claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
that question at paragraph 12 of Burton

This court answered

"We are not persuaded

that the UADA declares a public policy which is "clear and
substantial" with respect to small employers." The holding in
Burton

was not that the UADA was the "exclusive remedy" for

employees of small employers as defendant's brief suggests.
II
SEX DISCRIMINATION IS NOT AGE DISCRIMINATION
In deciding Burton

this court considered the legal theories

and holdings of courts from two sister states; Molesworth
Brandon,

v.

672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996) from Maryland which stated the

arguments for Dr. Burton's position and Jennings

v. Marralle,

Cal. 4th 121, 876 P.2d 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. 1994)

1

8

from California.

A comparison of these two cases in the context

of Byers' claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy based on sex discrimination is instructive.
Jennings

The claim in

was based on age discrimination so it was factually and

legally akin to the claim in Burton.

Molesworth,

hand was a sex discrimination case.
distinction is important.

on the other

The age versus sex

Sex discrimination has been illegal,

to some degree, since the passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e.
discrimination was enacted later.

The federal act enjoining age
Discrimination based on sex is

prohibited across the spectrum of civilized society while age
discrimination tends to be prohibited in employment.
The comparison in Utah law also shows the differences
between age and sex discrimination.

In Burton,

at paragraph 13,

this court sustained the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Burton's
claim "Because we can find no constitutional provision or other
statute which declares a clear and substantial public policy
against age discrimination in employment practices ..."

The

court said this dearth of foundational law may well not exist in
the case of sex, race, religion or disability.

Burton

at 18.

Judge Medley is not the only Utah District judge to address
the question of whether a sex motivated termination by a small
employer forms the basis for a claim of wrongful termination in
2

violation of public policy.

On March 19, 2001 the Honorable

Michael K. Burton considered the same issue in Gottling
Peterson,

v.

No. 000210087 (3rd District Ct. Murray Department).

his memorandum decision, attached, Judge Burton cited

In

Burton's

holding that this court had not found sufficient law to support a
clear and substantial public policy against age discrimination.
He then found that there was Utah law supporting such a claim
based on sex discrimination.

Judge Burton found that policy in

the Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1.
It is hereby declared that the practice of
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, ancestry, or national origin in business
establishments or places of public accommodation or in
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the
health, safety, and general welfare of this state and
its inhabitants; and that such discrimination in
business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state,
violates the public policy of this state. Gottling
v.
Petersen
Memorandum Decision at note 2 [emphasis in the
original]
Judge Burton noted the Civil Rights Act does not declare age
discrimination to be against public policy, distinguishing sex
discrimination claims from those considered in

Burton.

In addition to the Utah Civil Rights Act the Utah State
Constitution also provides a clear and substantial public policy
against sex discrimination.

Article I, Section I provides;

All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,

3

possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse
of that right.
"Men" as used in Utah law, the Utah Constitution included, means
men and women.

Utah Code Anno. 68-3-12.

Angela Byers claim of wrongful termination in violation of
the public policy against sex discrimination is similar to Hubert
Burton's claim of age discrimination is similar only in that they
were both discriminated against.

The policy against sex

discrimination is older and more pervasive than that against age
discrimination.

It is clear and substantial.
Ill

THE BASES FOR PUBLIC POLICY ARE NOT AS NARROW AS APPELLEES ARGUE
Appellees suggest that a clear and substantial public policy
may not be found in Title VII and that such policy may only be
found in Utah statutes.

This court's prior decisions on what law

will support a clear and substantial public policy indicate
otherwise.
In Peterson

v. Browning,

832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) the court

examined federal and Missouri law and found there was a clear and
substantial public policy.

At pages 1282-83 of Peterson

the

court examined the use of federal law and the law of other states

4

and held

vx

[p] ersons who are terminated from their employment

because they refuse to engage in illegal activities that
implicate clear and substantial Utah public policy considerations
should be protected regardless of whether the applicable law is
that of Utah, the federal government, or another state."

The

issue is not who enacted the law but does it reflect a clear and
substantial public policy of Utah.
In Peterson

the court also said it would not require that

the foundational law be directly applicable to the claiming
employee so long as that law reflected Utah public policy.
note two of Peterson

At

the court cited the Utah Protection of

Public Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 &
Supp. 1991).

There the court acknowledged that that statute did

not apply to Mr. Peterson because he was not a public employee.
Nonetheless the court said;
While the statute does not specifically limit the
rights of private employers or address the employer who
directs an employee to engage in unlawful conduct, it
does reflect legislative approval of the basic
proposition that it is against the public policy of the
state for employers to discharge employees who seek to
act within the law.
In Ryan

v.

Dan's

Food Stores,

Inc.,

972 P.2d 395, 406 (Utah

1998) this court examined 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 and 21 U.S.C. §
801. Section 1306.04 as possible bases for clear and substantial
public policy.

In Ryan

the employee was denied relief.

5

If the

basis for that denial had been that federal statutes and
regulations can never provide the foundational law for a clear
and substantial public policy in Utah the court would not have
engaged in five pages of analysis of the federal code and
regulations but would have merely said the foundational law must
be Utah law.

Government regulations promulgated by authorized

officials may also be the foundational law for a clear and
substantial public policy in Utah.
In short, this court's prior decisions hold that to be an
appropriate foundation for a clear and substantial and
substantial public policy in Utah a law; a) may be a statute of
this state, of another state or of the United States, b) need not
be directly applicable to the injured employee, and c) may
include properly promulgated regulations.
In Burton

this court distinguished Dr. Burton's claim from

those in Molesworth

because Maryland had statutes, an executive

order and a constitutional provision proscribing sex
discrimination.

Byers has shown this court a Utah Constitutional

provision, a Utah statute specifically stating the public policy
of Utah, numerous executive orders, and numerous regulations
which show that there is a clear and substantial public policy
against sex discrimination in the Utah workplace, regardless of
size.

6

There can be no question that the policy is clear.

"A

public policy is "clear" only if plainly defined by legislative
enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions. Ryan
at 405.

The policy against sex discrimination is specifically

and clearly stated in Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1, the executive
orders, and the regulations.
The policy is substantial and public.

As Ryan states at

405;
First, one must ask whether the policy in question is
one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed
to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether
the public interest is so strong and the policy so
clear and weighty that we should place the policy
beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a
bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when
freely willing and of equal bargaining power.
First, it is difficult to imagine a more overarchingly
important policy than one which affects the economic life of half
the population.

Second, it goes without saying that women should

not be required to bargain with their employers differently, and
less effectively, than men just because of their gender.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The policy against terminating women because of their gender
is clear, substantial and public.

The distinction between the

sex discrimination case presented by Byers and the age
discrimination claim asserted in Burton

7

is clear.

Byers states a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

The trial court's order

dismissing Byers complaint should be reversed and the matter
remanded for trial.
Dated this

/> 7 day of March, 2001.

Robert HS
Attorney for Appellant
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Attachment

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
TOBY GOTTLING,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

V.

KELLY PETERSON, dba Carbmaster,
Defendant.

Civil No. 000210087
Judge Michael K. Burton

There are several motions pending before the court.1 Plaintiffs motion for partial
summary judgment and Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment are dispositive of
certain prominent issues and the Court will address motions first and then move on to the
remaining motions.
Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court "viewfs] the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." K &
T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). Because both parties are moving for
summary judgment, each motion must be evaluated separately, drawing all inferences in favor of
1

1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;
3) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint;
4) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion;
5) Defendant's Motion for Protective Order; and
6) Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Plaintiff.

the non-moving party.
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment seeks to eliminate four of the
Defendant's affirmative defenses which are: 1) That the Defendant is not the real party in interest
because plaintiff was employed by P.R. Incorporated, LLC, not Kelly Peterson personally;
2) That because the Plaintiff was employed by a corporation, Defendant Kelly Peterson is not
personally liable for Plaintiffs wrongful termination; 3) That the PlaintiflPs claims are preempted
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA); and 4) That the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies under the UADA. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, on the
other hand, seeks prevail on three of its affirmative defenses: 1) That the Plaintiffs cause of
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is preempted by the UADA; 2) That
there is no clear and substantial public policy against firing an employee under the circumstances
of this case; and 3) That Kelly Peterson cannot be personally liable for the wrongful termination
of the Plaintiff because P.R., Inc. and not Mr. Peterson was Plaintiffs employer. The Court will
address each issue in turn.
Defendant urges that there is no support in Utah law for Plaintiffs cause of action for
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Defendant further argues that Burton v.
Exam Center Industries, 994 P.2d 1261 (2000), precludes Plaintiffs claim on the basis that it is
preempted by the UADA. The Court disagrees with Defendant's contentions.
There is ample case law in Utah supporting a cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy. See generally, Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992);
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) Most recently the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Burton v.
Exam Center Industries. 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he

was discriminated against on the basis of his age and was fired for that reason. He sued his
employer for terminating his employment in violation of a public policy against age
discrimination.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

An at-will employee may overcome that presumption be demonstrating that (1)
there is an implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated
only for cause or upon satisfaction of another agree-upon condition; (2) a statute
or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under
certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of
a clear and substantial public policy, [citations omitted] In that case, we further
remarked that not every employment termination that has the effect of violating
some public policy is actionable: "a public policy whose contravention is
achieved by an employment termination must be 'clear and substantial' to be
actionable." Declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and
statutes, but not all statements made in statutes are expressions of public policy.
LI at 1263 (quoting Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997).
In Burton, the plaintiff relied solely on the UADA to establish a clear and substantial
public policy against age discrimination. The Court was not persuaded that the UADA alone
established a clear and substantial public policy against age discrimination with respect to small
employers (i.e. employers with less than fifteen employees). The Court stated,
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on age discrimination
was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable from the legislative statement of
policy. For that reason, and because no other statute or constitutional provision
bars age discrimination, we conclude that there presently exists no 'fundamental
policy' which precludes age discrimination by a small employer.
Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). However, the Court also specifically limited its decision to
claims of age discrimination, stating, "Suffice it to say that sex, race, religion, and disability may
present different considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those grounds
might conceivably be found in other statues of this state. That question is not before us and we
express no opinion on that subject." Id
Separate and apart from the UADA, the Utah Civil Rights Act also prohibits

discrimination based on sex, but notably, leaves out any mention of age discrimination.2 Utah
Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000). Additionally, the plaintiff has cited ten executive orders from
governors of the State of Utah, including our current governor, all forbidding the practice of
sexual harassment in every workplace in which state employees are required to conduct business.
Finally, plaintiff has cited to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et. seq. as evidence of an overriding federal
public policy against sexual discrimination. In light of these statements of public policy from
the Utah legislature, the Utah executive branch, and Congress, this Court is persuaded that there
is a clear and substantial public policy forbidding discrimination based on sex. Therefore, the
Plaintiff has stated a cognizable cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy
The remaining issue is whether the Plaintiffs claim is pre-empted by the UADA. There
is no controlling authority on this issue, and therefore, the Court will borrow from the reasoning
of another jurisdiction. In Molesworth v. Randall 672 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. App. 1996), the
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that Maryland's version of the Anti-Discrimination Act did not
preempt a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee by an employer
with less than fifteen employees. The Maryland Court reasoned that it would be improper to
assume that the legislature meant to insulate employers with less than fifteen employees from the

2

It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in
business establishments or places of public accommodation or in
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and
general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; and that such
discrimination in business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the
public policy of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000) (emphasis added.)

state public policy against discrimination based on sex. Rather, a more accurate interpretation of
the legislature's intent was that the exception for employers with less than fifteen employees was
a means to avoid overburdening the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the Act.
The Court correctly pointed out that, had the legislature intended to protect small employers from
common law wrongful discharge, it could have included small employees in the Act and thus
preempted the field of employment discrimination entirely.
Similarly, in Utah, our state legislature could have preempted the field of employment
discrimination, but chose not to. It would be inequitable to find that there is a clear public policy
against discrimination on the basis of sex, but that small employers are granted a license to
discriminate and their employees have no recourse available to them. Therefore, the Court finds
that the UADA does not preempt Plaintiffs common law cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment is granted with respect to affirmative defenses four and five.
The remaining issue raised in the parties' cross motions for summary judgment is
whether the Defendant can be held personally liable for the wrongful termination alleged by the
Plaintiff, or whether Plaintiff must name the corporate employer P.R., Inc. as a defendant. The
Court will hold off reaching a decision on that issue for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff has
sought leave to amend her complaint to name P.R., Inc. as a defendant. The Court will grant
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint should she choose to do so. However, the Court will not
issue an advisory opinion as to whether Mr. Peterson would be personally liable while plaintiffs
motion to amend her complaint is pending.
Second, Plaintiff has filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking the Court to refrain from ruling on
the issue of Mr. Peterson's liability until she has had an opportunity to take his deposition.

Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Peterson did not maintain the corporate formalities separating
himselffromP.R., Inc. The Plaintiff is entitled to discover whether the interests and ownership
of the corporation were such that they justify piercing the corporate veil. Therefore, Plaintiffs
Rule 56(f) motion is granted.
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of the Plaintiff are denied.
Dated this / /

day of March, 2001

District Court Judge

